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Notes 
Chapter 1 
economic history prior to World War 11. 
1. See Ford (1983), Williams  (1920), and Diaz Alejandro  (1970) for Argentine 
2.  Quoted by  Cardoso (1987) and Ford ([1962] 1983, 92). 
3. In chapter 3, where we discuss the Martinez de Hoz period, we also give the 
real exchange rate based on a comparison of  manufacturing prices in Argentina and 
abroad. 
4.  On  the Peronist  experience, see, in particular,  di Tella (1983) and de Pablo 
(1980a, 1984). 148  Rudiger Dornbusch and Juan Carlos de Pablo 
Chapter 2 
1. See U.S. International Trade Commission (1986, 76). 
2. Historical  annual  data  on  the  principal  macroeconomic  data  for  the  period 
1913-84  are  reported  in  a  special  issue  of  Estudios  (no.  39,  July-September 
1986). 
3. Williams (1920,  125) quotes from the report of the Rothschild Committee to 
the  Bank of  England:  “the  result  of  the  liquidation of  Messrs.  Baring’s affairs  is 
dependent in a very great measure upon the future value of Argentine securities and 
obligations;  besides  which  a much  larger  amount of  British  capital  is  engaged  in 
Argentina,  the  value  of  which  depends  greatly  on  the  rehabilitation  of  the 
exchanges.”  See, too, Hyndman ([1892]  1967) and Fishlow (1985). 
4. The  debt  ratio  is  calculated  by  assuming  a  1914 debt  of  $784  billion,  as 
reported by the Economic Commission for Latin America in  1964, and using the data 
for changes  in public  external  debt  in  Estudios  (no. 39, July-September  1986) to 
derive the cumulative external debt series. 
5.  On  the  Great  Depression  in  Latin  America,  see  Kindleberger  (1984),  Abreu 
(1984), O’Connell (1984), and especially Diaz Alejandro (1970, 1983, 1984). 
6. The province of Buenos Aires did suspend debt service. 
7.  See  Bittermann  (1973)  and  Avramovic  (1966)  for  some  data  on  postwar 
external debt. 
Chapter 3 
1. The deficit of the cuenta (per peso of deposits) is given by the combination of 
reserve requirements  (a),  the  share of  time deposits  in total deposits  (p), and the 
compensation on time deposit reserves versus the charge on demand deposits, i, and 
iD, respectively. 
DEFiD =  (1 -  a)(  1 -  p)iD 
2.  See  Calvo  (1986a,  1987),  Dagnino  Pastore  (1983),  Dornbusch  (1982), 
Dornbusch and Fischer  (1986).  Fernandez (1985), Rodriguez  and  Sjaastad (1979), 
and Rodriguez ( 1983). 
3.  If  the real interest rate effect dominates, there will be an initial phase of  real 
appreciation with rising rather than falling inflation. 
4.  See Dornbusch (1985a) for a comparison of the experience of Argentina, Chile, 
and Brazil. 
5. See Fundaci6n Mediterranea Newsletter  (December 1987). 
Chapter 4 
I. This chapter owes much of  its inspiration to Mundell (1971) and Cardoso and 
Reis (1986). 
2.  With B  and  eB*  the  domestic  currency  values  of  internal  and external  debt 
and P the price level, these ratios are defined as b = B/PY and b*  = eB*/PY. Note 
that  b*  depends  on  the  real  exchange  rate.  Given  a  debt  in  dollars,  B*, and 
domestic  real  GDP,  a  real  depreciation  will  increase  b*  and  hence  worsen  the 
budget  deficit.  It  now  takes  a  larger  number  of  “tax  dollars”  to  pay  a  “debt 
service dollar.” 
3. The real depreciation will increase the term b*, which for a given dollar value 
of  debts depends on the real exchange rate. 149  ArgentindNotes 
4. See Rist (1966) and Joan Robinson’s (1938) review of Bresciani-Turroni (1937) 
5. See the discussion in Simonsen (1983) on this point. 
for an exposition of this view. 
Chapter 5 
1.  This chapter draws on Dornbusch and Simonsen (1987) and de Pablo (1986, 
1987). 
2. How do we  know  that  the  economy  cannot? This,  too, is  an  issue in  game 
theory. Schelling (1982) has written extensively on how to make threats stick. Ideas 
involve poison-pill strategies.  Governments instinctively shy away from poison-pill 
strategies of  no return. As a result, the public does not believe the fierce anti-inflation 
rhetoric and, therefore,  the government  in  turn cannot afford to implement it. The 
late William Fellner (1976) developed these themes with great authority. See, too, 
Anti-inflation (1982). 
3.  See Simonsen (1986a, 1986b) for a game theory formulation where it is shown 
how players’ use of  maximin pricing leads to an equilibrium different from the Nash 
equilibrium that is assumed in full information, rational expectations models. 
4.  See Dornbusch and Fischer (1986). 
5. The Krieger-Vasena reform provided for initial wage adjustments that differed 
by  sector, recognizing that across sector there were differences in the time since the 
last adjustment. See de Pablo (1972). 
6. See Sargent (1982), Dornbusch (1985c), and Dornbusch and Fischer (1986). 
7. There is a difference in the required adjustments depending on the presence or 
absence of fees. In a system without fees, the banking system needs to achieve larger 
reductions in costs and hence in employment than under a fee-based banking service. 
8. See Arnaudo  (1979),  di Tella (1983),  and de Pablo (1980a)  on the  Peronist 
inflation and the failed attempt to stabilize it with controls. 
9.  On the Martinez de Hoz debacle, see Corbo and de Melo (1985), Diaz Alejandro 
(1982,  1988), Dornbusch (1982,  1985a), and Fernandez and Rodriguez (1982). 
10. The  most  comprehensive  treatment  of  the  Austral  Plan  may  be  found  in 
Hey  man ( 1986). 
11. Broda (1986) in particular emphasizes the importance of these early measures 
in  the initial success of the Austral Plan. 
12. Paul Volcker, as chairman of  the Federal Reserve Board, is said to have played 
a significant role in achieving IMF and bank acceptance of the plan. He subsequently 
visited Argentina in November of  1985. 
13. There is a need to make some allowance for growth of the informal and black 
market economy. Estimates are notoriously difficult, but there is a pervasive belief in 
Argentina  that  (just as  in  Italy)  the  underground  economy  has experienced  much 
higher growth than the formal economy. A study by  Guissari (1987), for example, 
reports growth rates for the formal (or registered) economy of 0.7 percent per year in 
1974-83  and  1.3 for the entire economy, including the informal sector. For the early 
1980s, this study finds that the share of  the informal sector is 30 percent. No doubt, 
just as in other countries, the underground is an important and growing feature but, 
just as elsewhere, estimates of the size must remain tentative. 
14. SOCMERC is a public opinion survey data base belonging to the consulting 
firm Aftalion, Mora y Araujo, Nogueira. 
15. Reported in La Nacidn (2 January  1986). 
16. See Fischer and Modigliani (1978). 150  Rudiger Dornbusch and Juan Carlos de Pablo 
Chapter 6 
1.  We  are  indebted  to  Marcello  Selowsky  for  suggesting  this  framework. 
The  basic  analysis  is  set  out  in  Selowsky  and  van  der  Tak  (1986).  An  alter- 
native  framework  based  on  intertemporal  optimization  is  reported  in  Blanchard 
(1983). 
2.  McCarthy  (1987) reports a capital output ratio for Argentina of 4.35 in 1986. 
Assuming  a  depreciation  rate  of  3  percent  per  year,  this  yields  an  investment 
requirement of 13 percent just to keep the capital stock unchanged. It is apparent that 
the present level of investment implies that net investment has been negative. 
3. In  scenario B, the debtlincome ratio by the year 2010 (not shown in the table) 
reaches b  = 66.7. 
4.  See Dombusch and Park (1987) for an analysis of Korean development. 
5.  See Dombusch and Park  (1987). 
6. See Carta Econdmico  (April  1986), 75-83.  For  an  extensive  discussion  of 
7.  See Ministerio de Economia (1986). 
8.  With an external debt ratio of 64  percent and an interest rate of 10 percent, the 
interest payments amount to 6.4 percent of GDP. A 15 percent real depreciation thus 
raises interest rates by  1 percent of GDP. 
9.  For a discussion of the economics of a free trade agreement between Argentina 
and Brazil, see Dornbusch (1981). 
distortions in the Argentine economy, see Nogues (1985, 1986, 1987). 
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